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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by the government by requiring a warrant sanctioned by the
judiciary based upon probable cause. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968) the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when a police officer stops,
searches and detains a person without probable cause, as long as the officer has reasonable
suspicion that the person may be engaging in illegal activity or a potential threat to those in
the immediate vicinity. This landmark decision paved the way for the enactment of § 140.50
of the New York State Criminal Procedure Law in 1971, which granted law enforcement offi-
cers the ability to stop and potentially search any individual within their jurisdiction based
on reasonable suspicion that the person is a threat to public safety.
Just over forty years later § 140.50 has become a significant controversy and public policy
issue for residents and observers of New York City, due to claims of racial and ethnic biases
exhibited by officers of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) operating under this
statute. “Stop-and-Frisk”, as it is colloquially known, has gained increasing media attention
over the past few years, with the number of monthly New York Times articles (about Stop
and Frisk) increasing tenfold during 2010-2012 (Persisco and Coviello, 2013). This tenfold
increase coincided with a number of legal and constitutional challenges to Stop and Frisk,
most notably Floyd, et al. v. City of New York which issued verdict in favor of the plaintiff
on August 12th 2013. The court ruled that the NYPD violated the Fourth Amendment by
carrying out unreasonable searches and the Fourteenth Amendment by carrying out racially
motivated stops.
1.2 Counterfactuals and Causality
Statistical tests of racial bias in policing settings are notoriously difficult to perform due
to the inability of the researcher to observe the counterfactual outcome. In a hypothetical
laboratory setting, the researcher’s ideal experiment would be to observe a police officer being
faced with a decision to stop one of two equally suspicious pedestrians, one of whom would
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have been randomly assigned to the treatment group (i.e. a racial/ethnic minority). We
expect that if this experiment was repeated an infinite number of times, an unbiased officer
would stop each pedestrian in roughly equal proportion, or with equal probability. Only if
the officer stops one pedestrian with a greater frequency than the other despite them both
being equally suspicious, can we infer racial bias. In every observational dataset on policing
stops, this counterfactual (the people who the officer did not stop) are never recorded. It
is tempting to use local population data in an attempt to construct the counterfactual
outcome, however this approach is flawed as it assumes that everyone in a given locality is
equally suspicious and ignores variations in pedestrian activity that the officer uses to assess
the likelihood of criminal activity. Furthermore, this approach conflates racial bias with
statistical discrimination by assuming that the demographic composition of police stops
should mirror the demographic composition of the locality. Drawing on the formulation
proposed in Persisco and Coviello (2013), if we assume that by conducting stops the police










where Ci(·) is crime per capita, which is a monotonically decreasing function of pi, the
number of patrol officers conducting stops. P represents the total number of officers under
the command of the police chief and βi represents the rate or the propensity of demographic
group i to engage in criminal activity, where 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1. If the police have reason to
believe that a particular demographic group disproportionately engages in criminal activity
(βi > β̄), then a police chief seeking to minimize crime is justified in targeting that group in
an attempt to deter the most crime per unit of policing manpower. Gelman, Fagan and Kiss
(2007) attempted to study this decision problem by using the arrest rates for Blacks and
Hispanics as a proxy for β in order to estimate the optimal allocation of police stops across
racial and ethnic groups if the police were unbiased. However, from an economic perspective
this approach is incomplete; what if the crime per captia function does not behave uniformly
across all groups? In other words, what if a one unit increase in police manpower does not
lead to the same decrease in crime per capita for each Ci(·)?1 To address this concern, it is
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necessary to impose first-order conditions on the police chief’s objective function in order to









j) for all i, j
where C ′i(·) and C ′j(·) are the elasticites of crime to policing for demographic groups i and j.
If these elasticites are not uniform (i.e., C ′i(·) 6= C ′j(·)), then a racially unbiased police chief
may still disproportionately target a group in excess of their relative crime participation
rates. Therefore, one cannot infer racial bias in policing stops without first knowing the
crime elasticites of each group. It is difficult to empirically estimate crime elasticites as
cross-sectional datasets only capture equilibrium levels of crime and policing, which often
vary simultaneously along with other confounding factors that are not directly observed.
1.3 Disparate Impact or Disparate Treatment? The Use of Force
in Police Stops
Race and gender discrimination remains a hotly contested public policy issue, which is not
surprising given that the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause was established to pro-
tect Americans against discrimination. However, very rarely in these policy discussions do we
distinguish between disparate impact and disparate treatment, two very distinct and legally
relevant categories. The former refers to policies that are neutral in its treatment of different
groups (i.e., not intentionally discriminatory) but ultimately affect groups of people differ-
ently. It can be argued that the police chief’s decision to allocate police manpower unequally
across demographic groups falls in the category of disparate impact as his primary objective
is to minimize crime, and certain demographic groups are known to engage in crime dis-
proportionately, consequently receiving a larger share of police stops. If one can show that
police stops are being allocated in excess of crime participation and crime elasticities, then
one can classify the policy as disparate treatment, since the discrimination is intentional
rather than a by-product. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier this hypothesis is not easily
falsifiable due to the absence of the relevant statistical information.
1As in Persico and Coviello (2013), Ci(·) is assumed to be a concave function for purposes of mathematical
tractability. I concede that there is some loss in generality, but the underlying economic intuition remains
unchanged.
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Given econometric limitations, we cannot directly address the question of racial bias in
police stops; however if we restrict the universe to only the people who have been stopped
then these econometric limitations are quickly dissipated. Racial/Ethnic disparities persist
even after a stop has been initiated, with minorities substantially more likely to be frisked,
searched and have force used on them. This is particularly puzzling as within the universe of
pedestrians who have been stopped, one would assume that they are all relatively “equally
suspicious”, therefore significant disparities between subpopulations should not exist. This
paper seeks to study one such disparity, namely the use of force by the police. By restricting
the universe and conditioning on observables, the question of disparate impact or disparate
treatment becomes irrelevant as we have removed the criteria of unconditional race neu-
trality. Put differently, if minorities were disproportionately non-compliant then we would
expect them to have a higher rate of stops where force was used–this is disparate impact. If
minorities had higher rates of force in excess of their relative rates of noncompliance, then
it becomes disparate treatment. If minorities have higher rates of force within the universe
of non-compliant stops, then there is no disparate impact or disparate treatment, only bias.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Racial Profiling and Urban Policing
Racial profiling and urban policing have gone hand in hand since the first emancipated slaves
from the war-ravaged South turned up on the streets of the urban North. Muhammad (2010)
examined the genealogy of Black criminality from its inception in the Gilded Age and traced
its transcendence from mere stereotypes to a full-fledged dialectic of social inquiry by the
turn of the century. He argued that the tenets of this social science discourse were racist but
operated under the guise of being objective by presenting statistical arguments to criminalize
Blacks. Muhammad highlighted a series of studies that revealed Black criminality as the
result of discriminatory policing, or in Muhammad’s words “Jim Crow justice”; the police
underreported white crimes and overreported Black crimes and then used disparate crime
rates as justification for racial policing.
Racial disparities in the criminal justice system extend well beyond police-citizen inter-
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actions. Sampson and Lauritsen (1997) argued for the necessity of researchers to employ an
analytic framework that views these disparities as a a cumulative disadvantage over the life
course; the concatenation of race and poverty amplifies initial disadvantages into racialized
trends and contribute to the overrepresenation of racial/ethnic minorities in all aspects of
the criminal justice system. Petit and Western (2004) studied penal inequality by estimat-
ing lifetime risks of imprisonment for black and white men at different levels of educational
attainment and found that on average, 3% of whites and 20% of blacks had served time in
prison by their early thirties. The risks of incarceration were stratified by levels of education;
at the most extreme end they found that black men with less than a high school education
had a 58.9% risk of incarceration, whereas whites with a similar level of education faced
only a 11.2% risk.2 They concluded that the pervasiveness of imprisonment among young,
low-skilled black men has catapulted incarceration from a tragic, unexpected occurrence to
an established stage of the life course for the aforementioned demography. The literature
establishes the ubiquity of racial profiling across space and time and provides a historical and
theoretical lens that can shed light on the initial question of Stop-and-Frisk: why is it that
in any given year Blacks and Hispanics comprise roughly 85% of police stops yet represent
just over 50% of New Yorkers?
2.2 The Economic Model of Policing and Its Limitations
Knowles, Persisco and Todd (2001) analyzed vehicle search data from Maryland, testing and
subsequently rejecting the hypothesis of racial bias against African Americans. They argued
that simply analyzing vehicle stop rates and search rates for disparities was insufficient
because if the propensity to carry contraband differed across groups, then the police are
justified in stopping and searching one group more often than the other(s). Instead they
proposed a hit-rate test analyzing disparities in search rates conditional on some ex-ante
probability that a search will lead to a hit (recover contraband). To carry out the hit-rate
test, Knowles et al formalized an economic model of policing behavior in the context of motor
vehicle searches by assuming that the police achieved utility through successful searches, and
conducted searches until the marginal cost of an additional search exceeded the marginal
2Other relevant demographic characteristics were held constant (e.g. income, age, etc.)
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benefit. In order to derive equilibrium predictions, the model also allowed for motorists
to dynamically alter their probability of carrying contraband based on the current search
patterns of the police. In equilibrium, hit-rates are equal across groups because if one group
had a higher hit-rate, then the police would search that group more often than the rest;
consequently, that group would lower their probability of carrying contraband in response to
greater police scrutiny. This lowered probability will result in less hits and the probability will
continue to fall until they no longer receive disproportionate attention from the police.3,4 The
paper found that the hit-rates for African Americans and whites were equal, and also found
that hit-rates were equal across a number of other driver characteristics, giving credence to
the argument that the police are unbiased and primarily seeking to maximize contraband
seizures.
Harcourt (2004), among others, have challenged this economic model of policing arguing
that it falls short on several accounts. First, it’s definition of success is problematic: the
proper goal of the police is to minimize crime (and the social costs associated with it), not
maximize successful searches or arrests. He further argued that these two objectives are
at odds with each other under certain conditions; if the police allocate more stops towards
minorities and away from whites then while the offending rate of minorities may fall, the
offending rate of whites may increase.5 Depending on certain factors, the increase in white
offending rates may outweigh the decrease in minorities offending rates in an absolute sense,
because whites outnumber minorities in general population. Secondly, in Harcourt’s view the
economic model fails to capture important social costs associated with crime itself and the
social cost of carrying out discriminatory searches: a search that recovers small quantities
of marijuana should not be considered equally successful as a search that recovers an illegal
firearm or large quantities of more illicit substances. Furthermore, social costs of discrim-
inatory policing are not minimized when hit-rates are equal across groups; if, for example,
minorities are being searched at higher rates than whites then the social costs of conducting
3The level of policing resources is assumed to be fixed, a necessary condition for a unique equilibrium.
4In this context it is assumed that the marginal cost of conducting a search is equal across all groups.
If the marginal cost of African American searches were lower than for whites, then equilibrium will not
be achieved when hit-rates are equal because utility can be further maximized by searching more African
Americans. While it is theoretically possible for marginal costs to differ due to taste-based discrimination
(see Becker, 1957), this is often difficult to capture empirically and has been supplanted by more concrete
measures of discrimination.
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minority searches are higher since it requires a greater frequency in order to yield the same
hit-rate.
2.3 The Use of Force By Police
Max Weber famously argued in his essay Politics as a Vocation (1919), the state as a socio-
logical institution “claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory...The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence”. The police
are the physical embodiment of the state and exist to enforce and protect its institutions;
the application of coercive force is the core function of policing (Bittner 1970). The police
exercise discretion in their decision to use force and a considerable amount of research has
been done to identify determinants of the use of force. Organizational and psychological ap-
proaches have be employed to study this issue and have found that bureaucratic mandates,
precinct/policing culture, and social psychological beliefs about racial/ethnic minorities all
play a significant role in the officer’s decision to use force (Terrill, Paoline and Manning 2003;
Plant and Peruche 2005).
Sociological theories have largely focused on situationally based determinants such as the
socioeconomic characteristics of the suspect, the attributes of the officer and the location
of the interaction. Black (1976) developed a sociological theory to explain variations in the
application of law and hypothesized that people of marginalized groups will face greater puni-
tive treatment: racial/ethnic minorities, the homeless, the poor, the (mentally or physically)
disabled are all more likely to receive greater scrutiny from the police. Terrill and Mastrofski
(2002) tested this hypothesis using data collected from an observational study on police stops
in Indianapolis, Indiana and St. Petersburg, Florida. In this study they examined police use
of nonlethal force in an attempt to gain a better understanding of why the police resort to
force. The dependent variable was an ordered set of choices (of increasing severity) ranging
from verbal commands/threats to physical force . They found that the police were not more
coercive towards disrespectful (or non-compliant) suspects, and that being male, nonwhite,
poor and younger all increased the probability of force being used. They did find however,
that the level of force used was proportional to the suspect’s resistance, with officers choosing
5Again, policing resources are assumed to be fixed.
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a more severe level of force when the non-compliant behavior became a risk to the officer’s
safety. Using the same data but in a different paper, Terrill and Reisig (2003) examined the
influence of neighborhood context on the level of force the police exercised; they found that
higher levels of force was used on people that were stopped in disadvantaged neighborhoods,
and the effect of the person’s race was amplified by neighborhood context.
2.4 New York’s Stop-and-Frisk
Numerous studies have been done on Stop-and-Frisk, yet a broad consensus on the question
of racial bias remains elusive. Gelman et al. (2007) performed a “hit-rate analysis” on Stop-
and-Frisk data from 1998-99 and concluded that there was a racial bias against minorities.
The subject of this hit-rate analysis was the probability that a given stop would result in
an arrest, after being conditioned on race. The conclusion of racial bias stemmed from
the fact that white stops were more likely to result in an arrest than minority stops, yet
minorities were being disproportionately stopped. Assuming that the goal of Stop-and-Frisk
is to minimize crime, and by extension maximize the number of arrests, then a racially
unbiased officer should be stopping more whites in order to maximize the probability that
a given stop would yield an arrest, the complete opposite of what was observed in the data.
Persisco and Coviello (2013) replicated the hit rate analysis on Stop-and-Frisk data from
2003-11 and initially arrived at the same conclusion as Gelman et al (2007). However,
after they accounted for precinct level fixed effects they concluded that minorities stops
(specifically African-American) were more likely to result in an arrest than white stops;
adding further fixed effects for year and suspected crime showed that race was uncorrelated
with the probability of being arrested.
Hit-rate analyses may tell us whether or not minorities are being stopped in excess of their
relative rates of crime participation (or some other benchmark), however they are relatively
uninformative when it comes to assessing another crucial part of economic valuation–the
social cost of racial profiling in policing stops. Lerman and Weaver (2014) examined the effect
of Stop-and-Frisk on civic engagement in disadvantaged neighborhoods in New York City.
Using 311 calls as a measure for civic engagement, they found that a high concentration of
police stops was associated with greater civic engagement; however neighborhoods that had a
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high degree of stops that featured searches or the use of force, particularly when they did not
result in an arrest, significantly decreased neighborhood outreach to their local government.
Legewie (2016) found strong evidence that NYPD police officers actively discriminate against
African Americans in their decision to use force. He employed a natural experiment, relying
on publicized shootings of police officers as “exogenous shocks” and using timestamps and
geo-coded data to create control (before the shock) and treatment (after the shock) groups.
He found that when a police officer was shot by a black suspect, African Americans who
were stopped in the following days had a significantly higher probability of force being used
compared to African Americans who were stopped in the same location at approximately
the same time in the days preceding the shooting.6 The probability of force for whites and
Hispanics remained relatively unchanged. Even more interestingly, this experiment was
repeated for a police shooting were the shooter was white, and afterward repeated again for
a Hispanic shooter, and the corresponding racial/ethnic groups did not see an increase in
the use of force in the days following the shooting.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Background Information and Descriptive Statistics
The data for this study was obtained from the NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Report
Database and the American FactFinder website, which is managed and maintained by the
US Census Bureau. NYPD protocol dictates that stops are recorded by the initiating officer
by use of a Stop-and-Frisk report (UF-250 form), and uploaded to a database maintained
by the NYPD. Yearly updates are made publicly available, and the database currently holds
Stop-and-Frisk data from 2003 to 2015. Given the political turmoil brought about by federal
district court ruling in 2013, this study has chosen to exclude the years 2013 - 2015.7 Due
to the absence of detailed demographic data on neighborhoods within the different precinct
jurisdictions, the years 2003 and 2004 were also omitted and the analysis was restricted
to 2005 - 2012 .8 The neighborhood profiles were constructed using data collected from
6To clarify, ‘same location’ is a geographic control variable and does not refer to the location that the
shooting took place, but rather compares stops across the city that took place in the same location (e.g.
specific cross streets) before and after the shooting
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the American Community Survey (ACS); PUMA (Public Use Microdata Area) are nested
within precincts, thereby allowing one to construct neighborhood profiles by aggregating and
matching the PUMA to their respective police precincts.
Table 1 shows a cross-tabulation between race/ethnicity and the use of force by the police,
with stops disaggregated into non-compliant and compliant stops.9 For the purpose of this
analysis, non-compliant behavior was defined by the following activities: changing direction
at the sight of a police officer, evasive response to questioning, visibly engaging in criminal
activity, making furtive movements, refusing to comply with the officer’s directives, verbal
threats by the suspect and criminal possession of a weapon. It is immediately clear that
minorities are being targeted for stops, however without observing the counterfactual and
knowing the crime participation rates and elasticities, we cannot say much more on the issue
of who is being stopped. However if we restrict the universe to only people who have been
stopped, racial and ethnic disparities persist despite the fact that everyone who was stopped
were in some sense “equally suspicious”. Whites comprise 10.24% of the people who were
stopped, yet were underrepresented in stops were forced was used, both for compliant and
non-compliant; we observe the opposite pattern with Blacks and Hispanics, were they are
overrepresented in stops where force was used relative to their representation in the total
distribution of stops. Figure 1 shows a similar racial/ethnic trend across time and boroughs,
with whites consistently claiming the smallest share of stops where any kind of force was
used.
7Even prior to the court ruling 2013 was a difficult year for the NYPD in general; three unarmed black
males aged 16, 18, & 27 were killed by the NYPD in the months preceding the court ruling and racial tensions
as well as public distrust in the police were at an all time high. It was also an election year and mayoral
candidates openly questioned the authority of the police. It is also evident that the police responded to this
increased scrutiny; in 2011 and 2012, over 1,200,000 people were stopped-and-frisked, however in 2014 and
2015 the combined number of stops fell to under 70,000.
8This decision was due to the fact that the American Community Survey only goes as far back as 2005
9It should be noted that the data was cleaned prior to the construction of this table.The raw dataset
(2003-2012) had 4,792,542 observations in total, 214,957 of which were were discarded during the cleaning
processes after being deemed unusable; missing data for key explanatory/control variables or data entry
errors were the main reasons that led to an observation being discarded.
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy is two part: the first set of models (fixed-effects logit) focus on
identifying the effect of individual (pedestrian) characteristics on the probability of force,
and the second set of models (random-intercept logit) focus on identifying “neighborhood
effects”, or the proportion of variance in the use force that can be attributed to precinct
characteristics. In order to identify racial bias in the use of force, it is critical to distinguish
between the necessary use of force and frivolous use of force; failure to do so will lead to
incorrectly attributing racial bias to disparities in the use of force, when in reality the effect
of race/ethnicity is being confounded with omitted variables that significantly increase the
probability that force will be used during a stop. In order to circumvent this issue, stops
were disaggregated into compliant and non-compliant stops (assuming in non-compliant stops
officers are more likely to use force) and separate logistic regression models were estimated.
The dependent variable for each regression pforce is a binary outcome that takes on the
value of one when any sort of force is used by the police during a pedestrian stop. Force, if
used by the police, is recorded as one (or more) of nine possible categories on the UF-250
form and consists of any of the following actions: baton, weapon drawn, suspect against the
wall, hands, handcuffs, pepper spray, weapon pointed, suspect on the ground, other. The
main independent variables are factor variables for race/ethnic group (black, hispanic, black
hispanic, white hispanic) with white being the omitted category and factor variables for age
groups, with 55 and over being the omitted category; body mass index (bmi), whether or
not the person was arrested, and a categorical variable denoting “other race” were included
as control variables, along with precinct and year fixed effects. The fixed effect models also
allowed for clustered standard errors to reflect precinct intracluster correlations. For the
random-intercept logit, non-compliance was included as a control variable and stops were
pooled instead of being disaggregated, as the goal is to identify the proportion of overall
variance in the use of force that is being driven by precinct level differences. As with any
random-intercept model there are concerns of possible endogeneity, i.e. omitted variable
bias: a quick examination of the point estimates for the individual characteristics in the
random-intercept model revealed that they closely mirrored the point estimates in the fixed
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effects model. To further dispel any fears of endogeneity a scatterplot of the mean-centered
fixed effects and predicted random effects was constructed and the points fell almost entirely
on the fitted line y = x. The point estimates from the random-intercept model were not
used in the main analysis and can be found (along with the scatterplot) in Appendix A.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 The Role of Individual Characteristics
Table 2 shows the exponentiated coefficients (odds-ratio) and standard errors of four logistic
regressions with pforce as the dependent variable. Regressions (1) & (2) are pairwise iden-
tical in specification, as are regressions (3) & (4), with the first regression of each pair being
restricted to non-compliant stops and the latter being restricted to compliant stops. The
only difference in specification between the pairs of regressions is the treatment of Hispanic
pedestrians: the NYPD records Hispanic stops as either Black Hispanic or White Hispanic,
and the first pair of regressions ignored this demarcation and aggregated them into a single
Hispanic category, whereas the second pair of regressions maintained the original categoriza-
tion. In the second pair of regressions, Non-Hispanic Black pedestrians where removed from
the data in an attempt to isolate the effect of race in the context of Hispanic ethnicity.
Across all regressions the variables for race and ethnicity are statistically significant and
greater than one, indicating that minorities are more likely to have force used on them
relative to whites, regardless of compliance or non-compliance. The effect of race in the
context of Hispanic ethnicity is equally telling: in both regressions (3) (non-compliant) and
(4) (compliant) Black Hispanics are more likely to have force used on them relative to both
whites and White Hispanics. For age, the effect of age group can only be interpreted relative
to the omitted category (55+); we see that younger pedestrians are significantly more likely
to force used on them relative to older pedestrians, and the magnitude of the effect decreases
as the age group increases. The pattern holds across all four regressions.
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4.2 Spatial Disparities and Neighborhood Effects
In order to examine whether spatial disparities in the use of force by the NYPD are correlated
with racial demographics, a set of separate random-intercept logistic regressions were esti-
mated. The data was partitioned into distinct 3-year time periods and the model was fitted
using the years 2005-2007 and 2010-2012. Table A1 shows the regression output, and figures
2 and 3 show the (normalized) distribution of random intercepts across precincts. These
random intercepts represent the contribution of precinct characteristics to the probability
that force will be used during a pedestrian stop, and are often referred to as “neighborhood
effects” in the literature. This differs from the previous logistic regressions in that it assumes
spatial differences to be random draws from a single distribution rather than mere regional
idiosyncrasy. The fixed effects logit estimates an idiosyncratic baseline rate or propensity
to use force for each precinct and controls for it when identifying the effect of individual
characteristics; the random-intercept logit assumes there is only one true propensity to use
force and precinct differences represent random draws from a distribution centered on the
true propensity. It is possible to impose a functional form on this distribution by estimating
a random-coefficients model, however this was avoided due to the erratic behavior and com-
putational complexity of those models. Nevertheless the random-intercept model is quite
informative and provides a descriptive, if not inferential, study of precinct (neighborhood)
disparities in the use of force.
The distributions of the random-intercepts were normalized to a fixed mean µ = 0 with
an unknown variance ψ that was estimated as a model parameter in the regressions; the
estimated values of ψ are ψ̂ = 0.2966 for 2005-2007 and ψ̂ = 0.3833 for 2010-2012. This
rescaling allows the random-intercepts to be interpreted as deviations from the mean, with
values less than zero representing deviations below the mean (less likely to use force) and
values greater than zero representing deviations above the mean (more likely to use force).
The estimated variances tell us that in 2005-2007 29.66% of the variability in the use of force
was driven by precinct characteristics rather than individual characteristics; likewise, for
2010-2012 precinct characteristics contributed to 38.33% of the variance in the decision to
use force. Precinct characteristics are attributes that vary at the precinct level as opposed
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to the individual level: demographics of neighborhoods within the precinct jurisdiction,
precinct specific mandates, etc. While none of these characteristics were explicitly modeled,
the random-intercepts give us a relative measure of how these characteristics affect between-
precinct variance. By ranking them we can then identify which precincts have the greatest
propensity to use force and which have the lowest propensity to use force.
Table 3 shows an ordered ranking of precincts based on their propensity to use force,
with rank 1 corresponding to the precinct with the lowest propensity and rank 76 to the
precinct with the highest propensity. The first four precincts with the lowest propensity
to use force all have extremely low minority populations, particularly Blacks; we observe
the opposite trend for the four precincts with the greatest propensity to use force, where a
large minority population corresponds to a greater propensity to use force. The exact trend
is also evident (if not more pronounced) in Table 4, suggesting that racial demographics of
neighborhoods are highly correlated with an officer’s decision to use force. It should be noted
that in neighborhoods with both a high white population and a high Hispanic population it
is not unusual for a large share of the Hispanic population to also identify as white; however
an exact estimate of this share was unavailable in the Public Use Microdata Area.
5 Conclusion
The results of this study provide strong evidence to the claim that NYPD officers exhibit
racial bias in Stop-and-Frisk interactions, specifically in stops where force was used. The
question of causality is central to econometrics and the methodology employed in this study
sought to identify, if any, the causal relationship between race/ethnicity and the use of force
by disaggregating stops into compliant and non-compliant pedestrians. Had no demarcation
been made between compliant and noncompliant pedestrians the effects of race/ethnicity
would have been biased upwards, as minorities are overrepresented in non-compliant stops
and hence the effect of noncompliance would have been confounded with the effect of
race/ethnicity.
This study adds to the rich literature on racial profiling and policing, specifically stud-
ies addressing disparities in the use of force. It also sheds light on another growing area
of research in the social sciences that has yet to be fully formalized–neighborhood effects.
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Geographers have known for some time that spatial patterns are correlated with a variety
of social outcomes, and extensive work has been done on studying the formation and im-
plications of these spatial patterns. However, as geographers their primary goal has been
the study of the pattern themselves rather than how spatial variations translate into social
processes; this paper attempts to go one step further by not simply studying space itself but
rather the demography of space and how spatial variations in racial demographics can influ-
ence outcomes in a police stop. This interpretation of neighborhood effects, while insightful,
is still quite naive: there exists no consensus on a formal definition of a neighborhood, and
many papers written claiming to identify neighborhood effects rely on researchers selectively
agglomerating people with certain characteristics in a manner that creates the spatial vari-
ation that is presumed to be influencing the outcome variable. In essence, the reported
neighborhood effects that are construed as causal mechanisms are largely an artifact of the
researcher’s design. New York City suffers from a similar issue of neighborhoods with no
fixed boundaries, with people on the same street sharing the same zip code can claim to be
residents of different neighborhoods. In order to circumvent this issue of fuzzy neighborhood
boundaries, this paper relied on administrative boundaries that are fixed with sharp discon-
tinuities: precinct boundaries. Put differently, what I’ve been referring to in this paper as
neighborhood effects should be more aptly named precinct effects, since the spatial variation
occurs at the precinct level rather than the neighborhood level. Given the (somewhat ex-
ploratory) findings of this paper, I hope that it may provide some sort of impetus for social
science researchers to formally define notions of neighborhood and space in a manner that
does not entirely depend on its inhabitants. While it is undeniable that there is reciprocal
determinism between these two entities (the neighborhood and its inhabitants), the practice
of allowing inhabitant characteristics to shape neighborhood boundaries is problematic as it
becomes impossible to distinguish between individual effects and neighborhood effects.
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6 Tables
Table 1: Stop-and-Frisk 2005 - 2012
Non-compliant Stops Compliant Stops
Race Force No Force Force No Force Total
White 57,113 210,734 13,682 143,640 425,169
7.41% 10.20% 8.87% 12.39% 10.24%
Black 426,978 1,135,638 80,779 600,394 2,243,789
55.37% 54.99% 52.36% 51.78% 54.07%
Hispanic 265,225 644,880 55,107 366,125 1,331,337
34.40% 31.23% 35.72% 31.58% 32.08%
Other 21,760 73,969 4,694 49,373 149,796
2.82% 3.58% 3.04% 4.26% 3.61%
Total 771,076 2,065,221 154,262 1,159,502 4,150,061
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
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Table 2: Fixed-Effects Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Black Hispanic 1.214*** 1.177***
(0.0387) (0.0390)
White Hispanic 1.124*** 1.080***
(0.0241) (0.0259)
Age13 18 1.511*** 1.591*** 1.454*** 1.670***
(0.0422) (0.0539) (0.0474) (0.0685)
Age19 24 1.499*** 1.543*** 1.491*** 1.616***
(0.0350) (0.0494) (0.0433) (0.0605)
Age25 30 1.409*** 1.438*** 1.403*** 1.481***
(0.0315) (0.0375) (0.0408) (0.0473)
Age31 36 1.291*** 1.303*** 1.274*** 1.364***
(0.0292) (0.0353) (0.0371) (0.0440)
Age37 42 1.164*** 1.201*** 1.165*** 1.262***
(0.0281) (0.0335) (0.0367) (0.0448)
Age43 48 1.095*** 1.154*** 1.096*** 1.200***
(0.0249) (0.0306) (0.0325) (0.0446)
Age49 54 1.011 1.046* 1.014 1.073**
(0.0233) (0.0278) (0.0310) (0.0343)
arrested 3.565*** 5.620*** 3.700*** 5.974***
(0.156) (0.346) (0.174) (0.395)
BMI 1.001** 1.000 1.001** 1.001
(0.000364) (0.000240) (0.000586) (0.000566)
Constant 0.279*** 0.102*** 0.263*** 0.115***
(0.0233) (0.00815) (0.0178) (0.00945)
Observations 2,834,038 1,312,743 1,272,527 632,061
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 3: Neighborhood Profile, 2005 - 2007
Rank Precinct Black White Hispanic Total Stops Force Used
1 108 2.40% 51.10% 34.20% 15,493 5.86%
2 123 1.20% 93.00% 8.60% 7,334 5.35%
3 62 0.70% 64.30% 11.20% 13,380 7.88%
4 111 1.70% 60.90% 11.00% 10,063 9.18%
73 70 39.10% 45.30% 12.70% 28,434 38.50%
74 52 20.80% 20.40% 63.70% 10,636 41.49%
75 50 14.60% 47.90% 41.80% 6,867 42.58%
76 44 37.50% 9.60% 62.00% 20,217 63.40%
Neighborhoods within precinct jurisdiction:
• 108 - Long Island City, Sunnyside, Wood-
side
• 123 - South Shore (Staten Island)
• 62 - Bath Beach, Bensonhurst, Gravesend
• 111 - Bayside, Douglaston, Little Neck,
Auburndale, Hollis Hills, Fresh Meadows
• 70 - Flatbush, Midwood, Kensington,
Ocean Parkway
• 52 - Bedford Park, Fordham, Kingsbridge,
Norwood, University Heights
• 50 - Riverdale, Fieldston, Kingsbridge,
Marble Hill, Spuyten Duyvil
• 44 - Highbridge, Concourse, Mount Eden,
Concourse Village
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Table 4: Neighborhood Profile, 2010 - 2012
Rank Precinct Black White Hispanic Total Stops Force Used
1 111 1.50% 44.00% 12.30% 12,709 4.89%
2 123 1.00% 83.90% 9.40% 6,163 4.99%
3 22 3,164 8.19%
4 62 0.80% 48.00% 14.10% 13,637 7.53%
73 115 5.70% 10.40% 65.00% 38,910 43.55%
74 32 60.60% 10.70% 22.40% 33,840 43.86%
75 46 27.60% 1.50% 68.60% 30,649 48.52%
76 44 33.60% 1.20% 62.40% 43,126 52.43%
Neighborhoods within precinct jurisdiction:
• 123 - South Shore (Staten Island)
• 111 - Bayside, Douglaston, Little Neck,
Auburndale, Hollis Hills, Fresh Meadows
• 22 - Central Park
• 62 - Bath Beach, Bensonhurst, Gravesend
• 115 - East Elmhurst, North Corona, Jack-
son Heights
• 32 - Central Harlem
• 46 - Fordam, University Heights, Morris
Heights, Bathgate, Mount Hope
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8 Appendix A: Endogeneity Concerns & Robustness
Tests
Precinct Heterogeneity: Random Effects (Intercepts) versus Fixed
Effects
Endogeneity is an important issue in econometrics and plagues many applied econometric
models: it can significantly bias regression coefficients, making it difficult to properly identify
parameters and estimate the true treatment effect(s). Endogeneity often takes the form
of an omitted variable bias and can be solved using proxy variables or an instrumental
variable design; in the context of a panel or hierarchical dataset (such as Stop-and-Frisk), a
common solution is to use fixed effects dummy variables as a proxy to control for unobserved
differences across clusters. This was the approach adopted in the fixed effect logit regressions,
where the goal of the analysis was to identify the average effect of race/ethnicity of the
probability of force. The fixed effect dummy variable controls for precinct differences, but
doesn’t explicitly tell us precinct specific contributions to the probability of force. The
random-intercept logit does the opposite: it provides a relative measure of precinct specific
contributions, but does not control for them in the same manner as the fixed effects therefore
leaving it prone to bias. These approaches are considered to be orthogonal with the latter
approach being less favored due to the increased potential of bias; however there are times
when they can deliver close results. Table A1 and Figure A1 shows that this is indeed the
case in the context of Stop-and-Frisk, as the point estimates for the random effects (RE)
and fixed effects (FE) are close across all time periods. Figure A1 shows a scatterplot of the
mean-centered fixed effects versus the empirical bayes random intercepts (from the 2005 -
2012 pair of regressions), with the trend line y = x superimposed. The estimates sit almost
entirely on the line with the tails of the distribution being pulled towards zero (the mean),
which is consistent with the empirical bayes shrinkage properties.
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Table A1: Random-Intercept (RE) & Fixed-Effects (FE) regressions
2005 - 2007 2005 - 2007 2010 - 2012 2010 - 2012 2005- 2012 2005 - 2012
VARIABLES RE FE RE FE RE FE
black 1.210*** 1.206*** 1.229*** 1.222*** 1.208*** 1.204***
(0.0611) (0.0606) (0.0505) (0.0496) (0.0520) (0.0510)
hispanic 1.149*** 1.140*** 1.185*** 1.175*** 1.128*** 1.116***
(0.0485) (0.0478) (0.0483) (0.0473) (0.0451) (0.0441)
age13 18 1.555*** 1.604*** 1.459*** 1.457*** 1.608*** 1.642***
(0.0763) (0.0789) (0.0696) (0.0694) (0.0727) (0.0705)
age19 24 1.429*** 1.471*** 1.421*** 1.419*** 1.597*** 1.633***
(0.0649) (0.0641) (0.0638) (0.0635) (0.0717) (0.0699)
age25 30 1.310*** 1.350*** 1.401*** 1.395*** 1.508*** 1.533***
(0.0521) (0.0541) (0.0706) (0.0712) (0.0639) (0.0641)
age31 36 1.186*** 1.218*** 1.299*** 1.301*** 1.420*** 1.454***
(0.0557) (0.0560) (0.0678) (0.0674) (0.0665) (0.0651)
age37 42 1.028 1.056 1.171*** 1.167*** 1.243*** 1.253***
(0.0517) (0.0503) (0.0595) (0.0594) (0.0579) (0.0556)
age43 48 1.032 1.062 1.073 1.066 1.168*** 1.181***
(0.0497) (0.0471) (0.0607) (0.0597) (0.0604) (0.0611)
age49 54 0.936 0.962 0.988 0.991 1.100 1.130**
(0.0570) (0.0574) (0.0560) (0.0556) (0.0661) (0.0650)
ncompli 2.622*** 2.589*** 2.656*** 2.674*** 2.591*** 2.627***
(0.108) (0.104) (0.134) (0.134) (0.111) (0.115)
arrested 4.214*** 4.207*** 4.044*** 4.035*** 3.857*** 3.913***
(0.240) (0.239) (0.213) (0.217) (0.186) (0.193)
bmi 0.998* 0.999* 1.002 1.002 1.001 1.002*
(0.000795) (0.000768) (0.00180) (0.00181) (0.000885) (0.000854)
Constant 0.0894*** 0.0500*** 0.0567*** 0.123*** 0.0675*** 0.0825***
(0.00874) (0.00374) (0.00630) (0.0106) (0.00572) (0.00771)
Cons(Precinct) 1.345*** 1.467*** 1.323***
(0.0664) (0.0911) (0.0653)
Var(Precinct) 0.2966 0.3833 0.2798
(0.0493) (.0621) (.0494)
Observations 129,953 129,953 123,458 123,458 124,396 124,396
25
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